election, her political coalition, the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, expanded its representation in parliament by nearly 10 percent, to 31 percent. Meanwhile Yushchenko's Our Ukraine Bloc remained at 14 percent. Conceivably, these two electoral bases could together have outvoted Yanukovych's electorate, repeating their victory in 2004. Yet the Yanukovych campaign defeated Tymoshenko in 2010 by nearly nine hundred thousand votes, without employing the methods of vote rigging and fraud that marred the 2004 election.
In this article, I employ gender analysis to examine the electoral dynamics of the presidential election of 2010 and explore the popular base of support Tymoshenko has developed. Gender analysis is an approach to political as well as social processes that assesses the impact of societal standards of masculinity and femininity. It has been used to gain insight into the outcomes of elections, as well as various other aspects of the social and political transformations taking place in postcommunist countries. 1 However, little serious attention has been devoted to the role gender has played in Tymoshenko's political career or in Ukrainian politics more generally.
2 Instead, explanations of the results of elections have focused on ethnonational loyalties. Principally, observers assume that electoral support in Ukraine is driven by regionalism, which pits the "east" and the "West" of the country against one another in conflicts over Ukraine's national identity and geopolitical orientation. 3 The issues of regionalism raised by observers of Ukrainian political contests are crucial to explaining patterns of electoral support. However, elections in Ukraine are also deeply gendered. The prominence of a female frontrunner for the presidency in 2010 provides an opportunity to analyze the obstacles that women must overcome to be included in the post-Soviet political system. Gender analysis sheds light on the determinants of women's agency vis-à-vis the state, demonstrating that gender intersects in complex ways with understandings of inclusion that are ethnonationally based. Here I show that women and men in the electorate responded differently across Ukraine's four regions when presented with the choice between Yanukovych and Tymoshenko in 2010 than they did to the choice between Yanukovych and Yushchenko in 2004. I first examine trends in women's political representation and participation, placing Ukraine into comparative perspective relative to other postcommunist countries. I then use official results and exit polls to explore the social bases of support for Yanukovych and the other candidates who stood against him in 2004 versus 2010. I consider the extent and nature of the decline in support for Tymoshenko among "Orange voters" relative to the previous election. Last, I explore the potential effect of the authoritarian crackdown under Yanukovych on support for Tymoshenko.
Gender and Elections in Ukraine
In her 1993 book Cinderella Goes to Market: Citizenship, Gender and Women's Movements in East Central Europe, Barbara einhorn became one of the first scholars to explore the political role that gender was playing in the transition from state socialism. Throughout the postcommunist region, she noted that women were being marginalized politically in reaction to a resurgence of traditional gender values coding women as mothers and wives and representing politics as a masculine domain that was "not for women."
4 einhorn warned that a significant erosion of women's rights would take place unless women came together to challenge the new patriarchal order: "Only time, the revival of civil society networks, and women's activism may change this. If socialism subordinated women to the macro needs of the economy and demographic demands, as some maintain, so now nationalism is instrumentalizing women by reducing them to their reproductive role." 5 The transformations that swept countries undergoing transitions have brought many of the problems einhorn discussed: rampant unemployment and underemployment for women, compounded by stresses resulting from the impoverishment of much of the population. Just as einhorn predicted, initially few women were able to break into politics. Nevertheless, over the course of the subsequent two decades, the level of women's representation and visibility in politics has risen significantly in most postcommunist countries. By 2010, the average level of women's representation in parliament had reached 18 percent for post-Soviet states and 19 percent for the countries of Central and eastern europe. These levels of representation place these two groups of postcommunist countries at or near the worldwide average of 19 percent and only a few percentage points below the average for the countries of europe, 22 percent (see Tables 1 and 2) . In Ukrainian politics, however, the representation of women remains very low. In the 1980s, due to gender quotas imposed throughout the Soviet Union, women comprised 33 percent of all deputies of the Verkhovna Rada, the legislature of Ukraine. Women's representation in the Rada plummeted with the advent of competitive elections. In 1990, at the first election to the Ukrainian parliament, women won only 3 percent of the seats. In later elections, their representation increased modestly, hovering between 5 and 8 percent. Since the parliamentary elections of 2007, women deputies have held 8 percent of the seats in the Rada. Currently, this level of women's representation places Ukraine 112th in world rankings. 6 Among postcommunist countries only Georgia, with 7 percent, and Mongolia, with 4 percent, have lower percentages of women in parliament. even though women numerically outnumber men in the electorate and Yulia Tymoshenko has twice served as the country's prime minister, men comprise the vast majority of politicians and figure prominently behind the scenes as funders and strategists.
The neotraditional attitudes toward "female" and "male" authority that concerned einhorn shape electoral dynamics in numerous ways. Most obviously, gender bias in Ukrainian politics is revealed in the language that permeates elite discussions of political affairs. In Ukraine it is common to hear it said that "politics is no place for women." Studies of political discourse find that today a woman in Ukraine is expected to be a Berehynia (hearth guardian)-a devoted mother or wife who tends to the home and family. Such gender scholars as Oksana Kis have found that a second model of femininity also exists: the sex symbol, or "Barbie."
7 Both these models discourage Ukrainians from seeing women as viable political leaders. Nevertheless, there appear to be two alternative readings of the Berehynia figure. According to a neotraditional reading, Ukrainian women should devote themselves to their family and play supportive (and hence, subordinate) roles in political life. However, an alternative feminist-nationalist reading views Ukrainian women as "empowered" by their gender role to play a significant role in reforming the postSoviet Ukrainian state. According to this second perspective, in Ukraine it is men who are the "weaker sex." Due to a gender imbalance resulting from a long history of colonialism, men are too weak to lead their nation politically, and it is women who have a special mission to "save" their nation. Such a standpoint on women's political participation has been promoted by women's associations that emerged from the Ukrainian independence movement and are active mainly in Western Ukraine. These women's organizations see women's political participation as necessitated by the gendered impact of colonialism, which robbed Ukrainian men of their masculinity and compelled women to become the main bearers of nationhood and national identity in the home as well as public life. 8 The low level of representation of women in parliament and the prevalence of gendered discourses in politics might suggest that the public generally prefers for women to play traditional roles in Ukrainian society and politics. However, public opinion polls conducted in 1996 and 2006 by the World Values Survey show that attitudes toward women's empowerment have grown less traditionalistic over time. 9 Overall, there has been a decline since the mid-1990s in support for beliefs that might lead voters to oppose the candidacy of women for public office. For example, while in 1996, according to the World Values Survey, 63.4 percent of the population of Ukraine agreed with the statement, "Men make better political leaders than women do," by 2006, these rates had dropped significantly to 54.8 percent. Moreover, a shift appears to be taking place away from more conservative beliefs regarding gender roles.
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Openness to women's political empowerment has been more pronounced among women than it has been among men. In 2006, the World Values Survey showed that 58.7 percent of women versus only 28.8 percent of men expressed support for women as political leaders. Women also have been adopting more positive attitudes toward women's political rights. evidence for such a shift is suggested by their more favorable attitudes toward equal rights for women and men. In 2006, there was a 10 percentage point gender difference in response to a question asking whether equal rights for women and men was essential to democracy: 52.2 percent of women as opposed to 42.7 percent of men considered equal rights essential to democracy.
The World Values Survey also demonstrates that attitudes toward women's political empowerment differ significantly across Ukraine's four regions. In 2006, when asked by the World Values Survey whether equal rights for women and men are essential to democracy, strong agreement was expressed by 74.9 percent of Western Ukrainians, 67.0 percent of eastern Ukrainians, 52.5 percent of Central Ukrainians, but only 50.3 percent of Southern Ukrainians. Thus, Western Ukrainians appear to express the strongest support for gender equality. They are followed closely by eastern Ukrainians. However, Central and Southern Ukrainians exhibit the least supportive attitudes toward gender equality. By contrast, when asked whether men make better political leaders than women, disagreement was expressed by 56.4 percent of Central Ukrainians, 44.9 percent of Western Ukrainians, 44.1 percent of eastern Ukrainians, and 27.8 percent of Southern Ukrainians. Thus, when asked to assess whether men are better political leaders, Central Ukrainians expressed views that were the most potentially supportive of women political leaders, while Western and eastern Ukrainians were only moderately supportive. Generally, Southern Ukrainians were the least supportive of women's political empowerment.
Overall, these data suggest that there is growing demand for electing women to public office and for other forms of empowerment. Yet demand varies considerably by gender and region. There is greater general support for women political leaders among women. A majority of the population assumes that men make better political leaders than women. Indeed, only in Central Ukraine does a slim majority of the population reject this view. Yet women's empowerment is not universally opposed. There is considerable support in Western and eastern Ukraine for gender equality. It might be possible for a strong candidate to mold these values into a general political platform supportive of women political leaders. However, there also appears to be a significant share of the electorate that exhibits support for conservative gender roles. Indeed, men in general appear to hold beliefs that might act as barriers to women who challenge traditional gender roles.
Tymoshenko as a Political Leader
Yulia Tymoshenko has struggled with the complex gender dynamics of Ukrainian politics during her career as a public figure. She has nonetheless proven herself capable of meeting and exceeding the gendered expectations women politicians face. early in her career as a politician, Tymoshenko was cast by her detractors as the "Gas Princess" and the "oligarch in skirts." Presumably, these terms were employed to indicate that she was deemed not only too "sexy," but also too involved in the masculine domain of energy trading, to be considered a good Ukrainian woman, let alone a good politician. In response, she transformed herself into a veritable Berehynia. She learned to speak Ukrainian, allied herself with the traditionalistic Victor Yushchenko, and donned her signature wrap-around peasant braid. During the Orange Revolution, her fiery speeches and willingness to stand up to armed troops earned her new sobriquets that were more positive, but no less gendered: "Ukrainian Joan of Arc," "warrior princess," "Orange Princess," and "Goddess of the Revolution." referred to as Ukraine's "very own princess," "Lady Yu" (in reference to england's Princess Diana, "Lady Di"). In a nod to the national discourse of Ukrainian "empowered womanhood," Tymoshenko has also been represented as the "only real man in Ukrainian politics." Indeed, she repeatedly has faced accusations from other politicians of being too strong and domineering. Some critics have even compared her to Stalin and Catherine the Great, or branded her a common criminal. 12 Perhaps to soften her image as a leader, she has embraced maternalist policy issues related to improving the welfare of families and children, recoding herself as the guardian of future generations (e.g., significantly increasing "mother's pensions" given after the birth of a child, introducing improvements in the public health system). Similarly, she has avoided causes associated with women's rights advocacy groups (e.g., increasing the representation of women in parliament, defending women from sexual harassment in the workplace).
During the 2010 presidential campaign, Tymoshenko worked hard to counter public criticism aimed at the Yushchenko administration for its failures to deliver on the promises made during the Orange Revolution. She typically appeared in public as the "Mother of the Nation," a quasi-mythic matriarchal figure clad in chaste white embroidered folk garb. In her campaign speeches, in keeping with the ambivalent gender role expectations of Ukrainian political discourse, she constantly reassured the public that she was a traditional woman who valued nurturing and cooperation (and prayer), and who wanted to become president not because she sought power but because she cared so deeply about the needs of her "family," the Ukrainian nation. Indeed, her campaign slogan, "She is Ukraine," represented Tymoshenko as the embodiment of the nation and counterpoised her to the corrupt (male) world of Ukrainian politics (e.g., "they squabble, she works, she is Ukraine," "she will win, she is Ukraine").
By contrast, the Yanukovych campaign depicted Ukraine as a country that needed the discipline provided by a strict father figure: Viktor Yanukovych. The desirability of a restoration of "natural" gender roles in politics and private life was a crucial aspect of the Yanukovych campaign's message. Both Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko were portrayed in unfavorable terms as "gender deviant," failing to conform to their "natural" gender roles. Nevertheless, the assertion that only Yanukovych possessed the strong masculine qualities needed to resolve Ukraine's economic and political problems was used more forcefully against Tymoshenko. This became clear shortly before the first round of the 2010 election, when Yanukovych refused to participate in a televised debate with Tymoshenko, stating publicly in regard to Tymoshenko that "if she is a women, then she should go to the kitchen and show off her talents there" (якщо вона жінка-то повинна йти на кухню і показувати там свої примхи). Hanna Herman, the only woman in Yanukovych's inner circle of advisors, defended Yanukovych's standpoint on gender roles, further stressing that the problem was not Yanukovych's sexism, but Tymoshenko's failure to understand the "natural" division of political labor in Ukraine. According to Herman, "not only do most women consider preparing lunch and tending to the home a woman's 'highest mission,'" but Tymoshenko "should know that tending to the welfare of her family is the greatest thing a woman can do for Ukraine." 13 
The 2010 Election
Yulia Tymoshenko's impressive performance increased her share of the vote from 25 to 46 percent between rounds one and two of the 2010 election. Yet she lost the election. Why? Most observers have found recent Ukrainian elections to be driven by regionalism. Colton, for instance, has argued that Yanukovych's victory was accomplished through a rising tide that lifted support for his candidacy slightly in his two key subgroups in the east and South regions of the country. 
Gender and Exit Polls
In trying to explain Tymoshenko's defeat, it is necessary to consider the interactive effects gender and region had on patterns of
17 Moreover, Tymoshenko's weaker showing among men represents a significant departure from previous electoral dynamics, as men in Ukraine have tended to outnumber women among supporters of candidates coded as right-leaning. 18 exit polls reveal that in response to Tymoshenko's candidacy, complex gender and national loyalties (and antipathies) came into play. This was particularly the case within the Orange electorate. Tymoshenko performed considerably better among women than men in two of the country's regions: the West and the Center (see Table 3 ). In the West, there was a 4 percent gender gap, with 81 percent of women as opposed to 77 percent of men voting for Tymoshenko. In the Center, there was a gender gap of 8 percentage points, due to the considerably higher levels of support Tymoshenko received among women voters, with 67 percent of women voting for her, but only 59 percent of men. These gender differences are striking when taking into consideration that there was no gender gap in 2004 in these two regions, as men and women exhibited similar levels of support for Yushchenko (92 percent among Western voters compared to 82 percent among Central voters). In sum, Tymoshenko received the support of significant numbers of Yushchenko voters in both these core regions. However, exit polls indicate that her attractiveness as a candidate varied by gender. "Orange" women-women who voted for Yushchenko in the West and Center during the 2004 elections-were more likely to transfer their loyalties from Yushchenko to Tymoshenko than their male counterparts.
The effects of gender loyalties and antipathies on the outcomes of the 2010 election come into sharper focus when extrapolating from the 2010 exit polls to estimate the gender breakdown of Yushchenko votes lost by Tymoshenko (see Table 4 ). In the West, 2. Yushchenko's male supporters in this region were somewhat more likely than his female supporters to vote for Yanukovych.
In the Center, the impact of gender bias among voters was even more considerable (see Table 5 ). In 2004, exit polls indicate that Yanukovych experienced a slightly lower level of support among men than women in the Central region (14.8 versus 15.7 percent). In 2010, by comparison, Yanukovych enjoyed a significant edge among men, with 33.1 percent of men as opposed to 27.5 percent of women voting for him.
Region wide, Yanukovych gained an estimated 500,000 votes relative to the previous election. But he was more appealing to men than women, and this gender extrapolating from the exit polls reveals that Tymoshenko probably failed to receive the votes of around 140,000 men and 120,000 women (see Table 6 ). A better showing in the South probably would have made only a small difference for the election's result.
In the South, Yanukovych's attractiveness to voters who previously supported him also varied by gender. In the South, women were more likely than men to vote for Yanukovych in both the 2004 and 2010 presidential elections. However, when faced with a choice between Yanukovych and Tymoshenko, men in the South increased their support for Yanukovych, narrowing the gender gap in this region from 6 to 4 percent. Due to the fact that turnout overall was lower, Yanukovych nonetheless lost votes in this region relative to 2004, receiving 27,000 fewer votes among men and 136,000 fewer votes among women.
In 2010 in the east, Tymoshenko received the support of 12 percent of women voters, the same level of support that Yushchenko received in 2004. But she won 11 percent of the support of men in this region, performing considerably worse among men than Yushchenko did in 2004, with 16 percent. In the eastern oblasts, nearly all Orange women appeared to transfer their loyalties from Yushchenko to Tymoshenko at the polls. By contrast, Orange men were more likely to withdraw their support, a pattern that resembles the gender dynamic observed in the West. Tymoshenko lost only around 26,000 votes among Orange women in the east (see Table 7 ). An estimated extrapolating from exit polls, we see that Yanukovych lost the votes of 167,000 men in the east, but he lost the votes of more than 800,000 women. Thus, Yanukovych did significantly worse among women than men who voted for him in 2004. These figures suggest that in the east, gender mattered a great deal in how Yanukovych's base responded to the choice between Tymoshenko and Yanukovych. eighty percent of the million eastern voters who failed to support him this time around were women.
My analysis of the 2010 election in this section suggests that the erosion of support among Yushchenko and Yanukovych voters varied by gender. Tymoshenko had much greater appeal as a political leader among women than men. But her appeal clearly also varied by region. electoral support for Yulia Tymoshenko demonstrated that gender and region both affected how individuals viewed her as a presidential candidate. This bias could not be explained by regionalism alone. The edge Yanukovych enjoyed in 2004 among women disappeared. His 2010 victory was likely due to two different processes. First, the Tymoshenko campaign lost the support of a significant number of voters, the majority of whom were male. exit poll analysis comparing the gender breakdown of the Tymoshenko electorate to the Yushchenko electorate suggests that men constituted a majority among the Orange voters who failed to vote for Tymoshenko in the West (56 percent), Center (61 percent), South (54 percent), and east (89 percent). Second, the Yanukovych campaign message stressed male dominance, losing many women's votes (a whopping 816,000 in eastern Ukraine), but gaining considerable support among male voters, many of whom presumably supported Yushchenko in the previous election. Were Tymoshenko able to retain equivalent support among men and women, she might have narrowly won the election. Instead, due to gender biases in the Orange electorate, she lost, despite considerable support from women.
Exploring Future Options for Anti-Authoritarian Mobilization
The pattern of voter realignment analyzed in the previous section indicates that in Ukraine, women as voters are now leading a broader shift away from political traditions that are patriarchal. The outcome of this election also indicates that men remain conservative. In 2010, many who supported Yushchenko in 2004 were not ready to view a woman as a viable political leader. How likely is it that Tymoshenko or some other leader can mobilize the broader electorate and build on her position of political prominence?
The defeat of Yulia Tymoshenko and the election of Viktor Yanukovych as Ukraine's president raise new questions about the possibility of future mobilization drawing upon the activist networks of the Orange revolution. These protesters followed Tymoshenko and her allies in challenging unpopular incumbents in the past. Yulia Tymoshenko is no longer prime minister and has declared her radical opposition to the new president and his cabinet. How available are local-level activists for future mobilization, particularly as the country appears to have entered a new cycle of competitive authoritarianism?
The Yanukovych government has initiated an authoritarian crackdown on civil society that creates new grievances, thereby encouraging oppositional mobilization among local activists. It has returned many of the incendiary political figures of the late Kuchma era to positions of visibility and influence. The new president, minister of education, and prime minister appear to be playing ethnonational and gender cards that they avoided under Kuchma's watch. Their statements are already making waves and resulting in protests by some familiar actors (e.g., students and national activists in Western Ukraine) as well as less familiar ones. Acts of protest coordinated by the countries' leading women's rights activists in eastern Ukraine, and FeMeN, a group of Kyiv women's rights activists who organize theatrical protests, have attracted a great deal of media coverage at home and abroad. Whether there will be a cycle of civil disobedience and protests depends to a large degree on whether the current government will continue to engage in repressive activities as well as whether antipresidential forces will unite around Tymoshenko, who has not previously forged ties to such groups, but who may begin to do so now.
Male dominance may continue to be a primary basis for Yanukovych's style of leadership. Since Yanukovych has assumed office, the Yanukovych administration has appointed the first all-male cabinet in Ukraine's history. Members of his new cabinet have repeated claims that only men can handle Ukraine's national crisis. Prime Minister Mykola Azarov, when questioned in public about the gender composition of the government, maintained that the government cabinet is no place for a woman, as "women have no business attempting to carry out economic reforms." 19 Public discussions of the new masculinist gender regime reveal that most commentators in fact do appear to accept the premise that politics is a masculine domain. With the exception of a small circle of women's rights advocates, commentators have expressed highly gendered expectations about the qualities, appearance, and behavior of politicians. Fairly typical were the remarks readers posted on a newspaper website in response to a public letter of protest signed by prominent women's rights advocates: "A woman politician is neither a woman nor a politician"; "They should have compared Tymoshenko to Mary, the Mother of God, and not to Hillary Clinton and Margaret Thatcher"; "I guess Yulia Tymoshenko proves that women can be politicians as well as women; but Thatcher really scares me"; "If they [the authors of the petition] maintain that women constitute 75% of civil servants, then they are responsible for all the corruption we deal with today . . . women don't want equality of representation in high office, they want to become the majority, that is, they want to seize power." 20 However, the current administration is creating a charged atmosphere that is fostering new grievances and sending a new wave of activists to the streets. Indeed, the presidential administration has already faced several days of protests by women's rights activists from FeMeN and has been the object of a petition initiated by Krona, a women's rights center based in Kharkiv. One visible leader of this wave of activism is Kateryna Levchenko, a former Kharkiv women's leader who served in parliament as a member of the Our Ukraine bloc and who is also the president of La Strada, an antitrafficking and women's rights NGO in Kyiv. Levchenko has already joined other prominent women's rights activists and is planning to bring a lawsuit against Azarov for violating Ukraine's equal opportunity legislation when he suggested that women lack the stamina to occupy positions in the Yanukovych cabinet. Nevertheless, such groups are small in scale and lack a mass following.
Studies that examine high-risk mobilization within nondemocratic states provide a useful concluding point for future work exploring the conditions under which oppositional mobilization will spread beyond such smaller-scale feminist micropublics. Research has found that oppositional forms of collective action in authoritarian settings typically emerge from within universities or churches. 21 These studies argue that "mobilization potential" can develop in authoritarian regimes when states use repression to limit the size of formal social movement organizations, as long as such institutional contexts are available that are relatively autonomous from power holders and can offer protection from repression.
Pfaff's study of the seemingly spontaneous protests that took place in the GDR in 1989 came to a similar conclusion. The crucial site where activists helped overcome barriers to collective action in the GDR were churches. It was there that small-scale groups began to refashion the official state discourse of the "Volk" into a protest identity, "a politically relevant identity constituted by and for the purposes of movement mobilization." 22 Pfaff's concept resembles what Gould calls a "participation identity," which he defines as "the social identification with respect to which an individual responds in a given instance of social protest to specific normative and instrumental appeals." 23 Similarly, in Ukraine's Orange Revolution, the notion of "peoplehood" that had been created in the past by the Soviet state, and the governments that were in power after independence, became the basis for a new understanding of the "Ukrainian people" that protesters in Kharkiv turned into a powerful tool for mobilizing mass protest against power holders.
Sustained participation in grassroots activism is crucial to the success of movements. Youth NGOs with links to transnational networks and grants from Western foundations are widely considered to be central to the success of electoral revolutions. 24 Most research on contentious collective action emphasizes the role of "social movement organizations" in mobilizing challenges to state authority. 25 Similarly, explanations of the Orange Revolution and other electoral revolutions tend to focus on youth NGOs. But such social movement organizations have lost their mass following, and some appear to have dissolved altogether. Most of the participants in the Orange Revolution were only loosely affiliated with civic or political organizations. Yet quite a few university students and many recent graduates nonetheless became involved in the Yushchenko campaign or served in electoral precincts as poll watchers.
Structurally, universities themselves are crucial in the success of challenges to the new wave of authoritarianism. In 2004, it was the pressure that Yanukovych and state authorities placed upon university students that first generated a sense of outrage that led them to become inclined toward political action and civil disobedience. In response to administrative pressure, many students who were previously politically disengaged or deeply alienated and had no network ties to youth groups became politically engaged and volunteered to work as poll watchers for the Yushchenko campaign. 26 Universities also served as sites of bloc recruitment of protesters who participated in direct action. This finding may prove important for understanding potential for future mobilization against authoritarian controls that are now being applied by the Yanukovych administration to institutions of higher learning. Students, rather than women as a group, are likely to act as the social base for further oppositional mobilization. To explain the likely centrality of students to future movements, it is useful to turn to the concepts of biographical availability, structural availability, and political engagement. Studies of social movement activism suggest that these three factors are significant predictors of individual-level participation in protest in Western countries. 27 Biographical availability refers to the "absence of personal constraints that may increase the costs and risks of movement participation, such as full-time employment, marriage and family responsibilities." 28 Structural availability refers to the presence of networks and other microstructures that link a person with other activists and facilitate recruitment into protest. Political engagement refers to political attitudes and beliefs that make individuals receptive to activism. These include liberalism and a well-established sense of personal or group-level political efficacy. These three factors are also useful for understanding participation in the Orange Revolution.
What structural, biographical, and ideological factors help explain the determinants of women's involvement in local efforts to challenge the state in authoritarian postcommunist countries? In Ukraine as in most post-Soviet countries, women as a group are constrained biographically as well as structurally. They tend to work full time and shoulder heavy domestic responsibilities. In addition, they are highly reliant on state bureaucracies that provide employment and social services and control educational access. Thus, they are particularly vulnerable to penalties for disobeying administrative pressure.
My own conversations and research with women protesters and activists at the local level in the eastern city of Kharkiv found related structural and biographical availability factors explained why despite gender constraints they were able to participate in the Orange Revolution. First, many were students, that is, the institution that made them structurally available for revolution was the university (and not an NGO). Second, many understood student participation in the Orange Revolution as the result of the flexibility of their schedules and the fact that they had relatively few family or employment duties. Without these constraints, their main motivator could be their "duty as citizens of Ukraine"; that is, as students, they were biographically available.
Ideologically, student activists were recruited for activism mainly because of their commitment to a liberalism tinged to varying degrees by Ukrainian nationalism. Activists stressed the need to defend one's right to vote but, more broadly, to elect a government that would respect constitutional rights and freedoms. More generally, activists stressed the need for voters to choose representatives that would respect individual and economic freedoms. They also emphasized commitment to self-government
